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RECENT DECISIONS
Civil Rights-A MENTAL PATIENT'S RIGHT To REFUSE ANTI-
PSYCHOTIC DRUGS: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NEEDING
PROTECTION
Throughout our nation's mental hospitals, doctors treat psychot-
ic patients with antipsychotic drugs.' Often they administer the
drugs for staff convenience or patient punishment, instead of treat-
ment. 2 In addition, the drugs' side effects are sometimes debilitating
to the patient.3 Patients and courts have become increasingly in-
volved in deciding whether an involuntarily confined mental patient
in a state hospital 4 has the right to refuse treatment with these drugs
and, if so, what is the proper procedure to protect that right. The
Supreme Court has the opportunity to decide whether patients have
this constitutional right and what procedures must protect it.5 This
piece will study the two recent decisions in this area, Okin v. Rogers
6
1 Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 363, 375-78
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Rhoden]; see notes 8-15 and accompanying text infra.
2 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
3 See notes 16-19 and accompanying text z5/ra.
4 The district court in Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), distinguished
between voluntarily and involuntarily confined mental patients in its discussion, but con-
cluded that both have the same constitutional right to refuse treatment. Id. at 1368. The
First Circuit, though, held that if a voluntarily confined mental patient refuses treatment, the
hospital can ask the patient to leave. Okin v. Rogers, 634 F.2d 650, 661 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981). Whether or not a voluntarily confined mental patient can be
asked to leave, no one doubts that he, like any other voluntary patient, can refuse a particular
treatment. This piece therefore discusses the involuntarily confined mental patient in a state
hospital.
5 Okin v. Rogers, 101 S. Ct. 1972 (1981). The name of the case has been changed to
Mills v. Rogers; however, this comment will continue to cite it as Okin v. Rogers.
6 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
1972 (1981). A class action was brought on behalf of the voluntary and involuntary mental
patients at Boston State Hospital against the Massachusetts State Commissioner of Mental
Health and various hospital officials and physicians responsible for plaintiffs' treatment.
Plaintiffs asserted that they had a constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic
drugs, basing their right on the first, fourth, fifth, eighth, and ninth amendments as applied
through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Absent emergency circumstances,
plaintiffs contended that they could make decisions and that the hospital should respect those
decisions. 478 F. Supp. at 1352, 1360-61.
On the other hand, defendants' primary argument was that committed mental patients,
whether voluntary or involuntary, are incompetent to make treatment decisions, and, there-
fore, the state has aparenspatiae obligation and right to provide treatment. Defendants fur-
ther asserted that mental patients do not have a constitutional right to refuse treatment. Id.
at 1353.
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and Rennie v. Klein, and their impact on these issues.
I. Antipsychotic Drugs
Antipsychotic drugs are a subclass of psychotropic drugs, which
are used to treat psychiatric problems.8 Antipsychotic drugs, which
are used in treating the psychoses, particularly schizophrenia,9 have
caused a therapeutic revolution.10 Antipsychotics not only produce
significant behavioral improvements, but, by controlling the more
disruptive aspects of schizophrenia, they also make feasible other
kinds of therapy. Some schizophrenics now function in the commu-
nity, while hospitals discharge others to nursing homes or halfway
houses. I I
Antipsychotic drugs initially sedate even the most intensely agi-
tated and excited patient, without producing sleep. Although the
antipsychotic effect may take weeks to fully develop, it will eventu-
ally modify thought disorders, autism, hallucinations, and delu-
sions. 12 The drugs do not cure the mental patient; they allow him to
function outside the hospital if doctors maintain treatment. 13 A sci-
entific study shows that ninety-five percent of the schizophrenics in
7 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). Rennie, involuntarily confined although not adjudicated
incompetent, sought a preliminary injunction ordering the psychiatrists and officials of
Ancora State Hospital, New Jersey, not to medicate him forcibly in a nonemergency. Rennie
reacted adversely to antipsychotics, but his best treatment combined antipsychotics with lith-
ium and an antidepressant. 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-40 (D.N.J. 1978).
The original suit later became a class action with patients in five mental hospitals seeking
a preliminary injunction. 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1297-98 (D.NJ. 1979). The parties recognized
that voluntary patients have the right to refuse treatment under New Jersey law. Id. at 1307.
The court discussed the rights of persons involuntarily committed to state institutions only
where no incompetency adjudication has been made. 653 F.2d at 846 n.12. But whether a
mental patient is voluntarily or involuntarily committed, they all have or do not have the
same constitutional right to refuse treatment. The voluntary-involuntary distinction only af-
fects how the courts protect that right once they find it exists. See note 61 and accompanying
text infra.
8 Okin v. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 653 n.1; Symonds, Mental Patients' Right to RefEse Drugs:
Inooluntaqy Medication as Crueland UnusualPunishment, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 701, 704 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Symonds].
9 Okin v. Rogers, 634 F.2d at 653 n.1. Schizophrenia is the most common disorder in
public mental hospitals. DuBose, Of the Parens Patdae Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of
&hKophrenia: Do the Bene=is to the PatientJusti& Involuntaq, Treatment? 60 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1151 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DuBose]. Doctors usually use antipsychotic drugs to treat
schizophrenia. Symonds, supra note 8, at 704.
10 DuBose, supra note 9, at 1169. Other therapies include milieu therapy, psychotherapy,
group therapy and occupational therapy. Id.
11 Id.
12 Rhoden, supra note 1, at 378.
13 Id. See also Symonds, supra note 9, at 704; DuBose, supra note 8, at 1169.
[Vol. 57:406]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
one hospital improved with antipsychotic drug treatment.' 4 For
these reasons, it is not surprising that doctors prefer antipsychotic
drugs for psychosis treatment.
15
Antipsychotic drug treatment can also create serious side effects.
During the first two weeks of treatment, mental patients may feel
drowsy and may also experience a number of annoying nervous sys-
tem effects.16 Antipsychotic drugs can also affect appetite, sexuality,
and hormone secretion. 17 The drugs may produce several side effects
severely impairing muscle control and movement.' 8 Another side ef-
fect is fatal in thirty percent of the case§ in which it develops.' 9
Thus, although antipsychotic drugs can control schizophrenic
symptoms, many informed mental patients, after considering the pos-
sible side effects, have refused such treatment. 20 They claim that the
United States Constitution guarantees their right to refuse the drugs.
II. The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug
Treatment
Mental patients' claimed constitutional right to refuse anti-
psychotic drug treatment has several possible bases.2' The right is at-
14 DuBose, supra note 9, at 1176. Not all authorities admit the effectiveness of anti-
psychotics. See Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Org. Mental Patients' Right to Re/iuse Treatment,
72 Nw. U.L. REv. 461, 474-75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Plotkin].
15 Symonds, supra note 8, at 704.
16 DuBose, supra note 9, at 1203.
17 Rhoden, supra note 1, at 380.
18 There are four severe neurological disorders which cause muscle impairment. First,
patients may develop Parkinsonian syndrome, entailing muscle rigidity, slowing of move-
ment, and tremor. Second, patients may develop akathesia, characterized by motor restless-
ness, pacing, and fidgeting. Third, patients may develop dystonia, typified by bizarre muscle
spasms, facial grimaces, involuntary tongue and mouth movements and difficulty in walking.
Fourth, patients may develop dyskinesia, characterized by a broad range of bizarre tongue,
face and neck movements. DuBose, supra note 9, at 1203; Plotkin, supra note 14, at 475;
Symonds, supra note 8, at 707 & nn.35-38. A particularly debilitating form of dyskinesia, and
foremost among the antipsychotic drug side effects, is tardive dyskinesia, marked by sucking
and smacking of the lips, inconsistent lateral jaw movements, and rhythmical forward and
backward tongue movement. DuBose, supra note 9, at 1204; Rhoden, supra note 1, at 381;
Symonds, supra note 8, at 707 n.38. The syndrome may persist for years, even after doctors
discontinue treatment. DuBose, supra note 9, at 1204. Cessation of antipsychotics usually
"cures" the first three disorders. Id. at 1203.
19 This rare side effect is agranulocytosis, marked by a sudden decrease in white blood
cells and a resulting increased susceptibility to infection. If it develops it is usually within the
first six weeks of treatment. DuBose, supra note 9, at 1205-06.
20 See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1359 (D. Mass. 1979); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F.
Supp. 1294, 1298-99 (D.NJ. 1979).
21 The common law also may offer protection, since it allows causes of action for uncon-
sented, intentional contacts. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs § 10, at 36-37 (4th ed. 1971).
Neither Rennie nor Okin discussed a common law right, and the common law has generally
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tributed to the eighth amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment,2 2 the first amendment right to freedom of
thought,2 3 the fourteenth amendment due process clause,2 4 and,
finally, the right to privacy.
2 5
A. Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Since courts have traditionally applied the eighth amendment
in the penal context only,2 6 it is difficult to apply it to involuntarily
confined mental patients. The Supreme Court has favored an "in-
tent" theory of punishment, suggesting that sanctions are punish-
ment only when the legislature intends them to be penal.2 7 Under
this theory, the eighth amendment thus applies only in criminal
matters.2
8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Rennie v. Klein29 followed the intent theory in refusing to apply an
eighth amendment argument to involuntarily confined mental pa-
not helped mental patients. Plotkin, supra note 14, at 490. This may be attributed to the
"commonsense view" that commitment and hospitalization are absurd without authority to
treat. Id. at 489.
22 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See notes 26-38 and accompanying
text infra. The eighth amendment is applicable to the states. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962).
23 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. See notes 39-50 and accompanying text infa. The first amendment is
applicable to the states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
24 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. . . . [N]or
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See notes 51-64 and accompanying text infra.
25 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Ehrlich, Freedom of Choice: Personal Autonomy and the Right to Pliva9 ,, 14 IDAHO L. REv.
447 (1978). See notes 51-64 and accompanying text infra.
The equal protection clause may also apply. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Where the
state allows voluntary patients, whether mentally or physically ill, to make their own treat-
ment decision, but denies that right to involuntarily confined, but competent, mental pa-
tients, no rational basis for the distinction exists and a denial of equal protection may result.
See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 842 n.7 (3d Cir. 1981); Development in the Law-Civil Com-
mitment ofthe Mentally 11, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1215-16 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]; Plotkin, supra note 14, at 495-96. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender-
based discrimination).
26 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977) (action by junior high school students
against school officials alleging they had been subjected to corporal punishment in violation
of their constitutional rights). Plotkin, supra note 14, at 494.
27 Developments, supra note 25, at 1331-32.
28 Id. at 1331-33.
29 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
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tients. The court stated that the eighth amendment prevents "ex-
cesses in the punishment of those who have been convicted of a
crime." 30 The court further stated that "it is necessary to distinguish
the status of prisoners who are legitimately being punished for the
commission of a crime from those who are mentally ill or retarded
through no fault of their own and are innocent of any offenses
against society."' 31 Finally, the court rejected the eighth amendment
as a proper protection for mental patients, because mental patients
are "entitled to more humane treatment" than that accorded
prisoners. 3
2
The Supreme Court recently indicated that it might be shifting
toward the "impact" theory.33 The impact theory holds that all dep-
rivations similar to those found in prisons come under the eighth
amendment.34 Significantly, the indication of this shift came in ref-
erence to treatment in mental institutions.35
The Court suggested that mental patients could receive treat-
ment similar enough to punishment to come under eighth amend-
ment protection.36 But when treatment such as the administration of
antipsychotic drugs has a legitimate and widely accepted therapeutic
value, and hospitals use it for therapeutic purposes, it is not punish-
ment.37 Hence, even under the impact theory, the eighth amend-
ment would not grant a mental patient the right to refuse proper
antipsychotic drug treatment.
38
B. First Amendment.- Rght to Freedom of Thought
Mental patients also argue that their constitutional right to re-
fuse antipsychotic drugs springs from the first amendment. 39 The ar-
30 Id. at 844.
31 Id.
32 Id. See note 61 and accompanying text hzfra (compelling state interest justifies forcible
medication in an emergency).
33 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 669 n.37 (1977). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535 n.16 (1979) (Court did not apply the eighth amendment to pretrial detainees because
they had not been adjudicated guilty).
34 Developments, supra note 25, at 1331.
35 430 U.S. at 669 n.37.
36 For example, treatment given solely for control or staff convenience, or psychosurgery
(lobotomy) are possibly "punishments." See Plotkin, supra note 14, at 494.
37 Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.NJ. 1978).
38 If the state hospitals do not use the drugs for therapeutic purposes, their use may be
punishment. See note 36 supra.
39 Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366 (D. Mass. 1979). Patients have also used the
first amendment to refuse treatment on religious grounds. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979).
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gument is that if the first amendment protects the expression of ideas
and thoughts, it must also protect an individual's right to generate
the ideas and thoughts.40 This argument is not new, 41 but the notion
that courts may rely directly on freedom of thought, where freedom
of expression is not in controversy, is a recent development.
42
In Okz'n v. Rogers aS the Massachusetts District Court applied the
freedom of thought rationale to an antipsychotic drug case.44 The
court held that the first amendment rights to freedom of expression
and thought include the right to be free from involuntary mind con-
trol, and upheld the mental patients' constitutional right to refuse
antipsychotic drug treatment.45 On appeal, the First Circuit did not
even discuss the first amendment argument.
46
Mental patients also made the first amendment argument in the
New Jersey District Court in Rennie.47 The court concluded that if
forced medication is otherwise appropriate, the temporary dulling of
the senses accompanying the medication does not violate the first
amendment.48 On appeal, the Third Circuit did not discuss the first
amendment claim.
4 9
Under the freedom of thought rationale, mental patients can re-
fuse any treatment that significantly affects their thought processes.
Mental patients could thus refuse antipsychotic drug treatment pre-
cisely because the drugs work-they modify the thought processes.50
If a mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse drug treat-
ment, it should not be solely because the treatment is effective.
40 Plotkin, supra note 14, at 494.
41 Rhoden, supra note 1, at 389.
42 Id. This theory probably arose because of modem behavior control methods, such as
drug treatment. Id. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Cir. No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BRooKs, LAW, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902 (1974) (court accepted this theory where a state
hospital wanted to submit a mental patient to experimental psychosurgery).
43 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), 634 F.2d 650 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
1972 (1981).
44 478 F. Supp. at 1367.
45 Id. The court stated that in extraordinary circumstances, such as an emergency, the
right can be overridden. Id. See note 61 infra (compelling state interest justifies overriding the
right to refuse treatment).
46 634 F.2d at 654 n.2.
47 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44 (D.N.J. 1978).
48 Id. at 1144.
49 Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3rd Cir. 1981).
50 Rhoden, sufra note 1, at 395.
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C. Due Process Liberty Interest or Rzht to Privay
A mental patient's constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic
drug treatment, based on the fundamental right to personal security,
has recently been acknowledged by both courts and commentators.
51
They find the fundamental right to personal security in either the
due process liberty interest 52 or the right to privacy. 53 The First Cir-
cuit in Okin adopted the privacy argument and the Third Circuit in
Rennie adopted the liberty interest argument.
In Okin, the First Circuit declared that a person has a constitu-
tional right to decide whether to submit to antipsychotic drug treat-
ment. 54 The court concluded that the right to refuse treatment
probably arises from the fourteenth amendment's due process clause,
"most likely as a part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integ-
rity, or personal security.
'55
The Third Circuit, in Rennie, also declared that a mental patient
has a right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment. The court stated
that forcible drug treatment intrudes on personal security, a liberty
interest protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. 56 The court rejected the defendant's argument that a liberty
interest protected by the due process clause must be rooted in state
law.57 The court stated:
A liberty interest may flow directly from the United States Consti-
tution itself, despite silence or contrary indication in state law.
Were it otherwise, a state's statutory law would occupy a position
higher than the Constitution. Thus it is not correct to say that a
liberty interest can only originate in state law. A more accurate
statement is that state law can give rise to a liberty interest that
51 Okin v. Rogers, 634 F.2d 650; Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836; Rhoden, supra note 1, at
382-88.
52 The liberty interest has been held to prevent "unjustified intrusions on personal secur-
ity." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 672-74.
53 The right to privacy is found in the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Its origin has been variously asserted to be the first,
fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. Plotkin, supra note 14, at 493. The right to
privacy discussed here may be more properly termed the right to personal autonomy. It is not
to be confused with the more common meaning of privacy as the state of keeping one's per-
sonal affairs nonpublic. Rhoden, supra note 1, at 384 n.103. See general' J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624-29 (1978, 1979-80 Supp.).
54 634 F.2d at 653. The court noted in particular the drugs' serious and potentially
harmful effects. Id.
55 Id. The court in Okin apparently concludes that the right to privacy arises out of the
due process clause, a proposition that is not universally accepted. See note 53 supra.
56 653 F.2d at 844.
57 Id. at 841-42.
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would not otherwise exist.58
The court concluded its discussion by stating that a difference of
constitutional significance exists between involuntary confinement
and commitment with forced treatment. 59 The Third Circuit thus
held that forced drug treatment infringed on a mental patient's con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest.
The court in Rennie also suggested that the distinction between a
constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment based on
privacy and one based on substantive due process is illusory.60 The
terms describing each basis-bodily integrity, bodily autonomy and
personal security-mean the same thing: people have a right to con-
trol their bodies. Whether the right is called a privacy right or a
liberty interest, mental patients are entitled to refuse antipsychotic
drug treatment.
6'
The right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment is not found in
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, or the first amendment's protection of freedom of thought
and expression. But it is part of the right to personal security found
in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and the right to
privacy. If the Supreme, Court agrees, 62 state hospitals cannot in-
fringe on that right without giving mental patients "due process of
law."' 63 Courts can ensure that hospitals provide mental patients
with due process by reviewing existing hospital procedures and,
where necessary, establishing procedures protecting that right.
64
58 Id. at 842.
59 Id. at 844.
60 Id at 841 n.6.
61 All mental patients have the same right to refuse treatment. Different circumstances,
however, will require different procedures to protect that right. See notes 65-89 and accofnpa-
nying text infra. Nobody disputes that hospitals may forcibly medicate mental patients in an
emergency. See Rogers v. Okn, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1352 (D. Mass. 1979) (parties stipulated
to this effect); W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 18, at 103 (4th ed. 1971). The mental patients
still possess their constitutional right to refuse treatment, but, because of the danger to the
mental patients and those around them, the state has a compelling state interest justifying
infringement of that right. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. at 1145-47. See general y Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination because of a compel-
ling state interest). See also Rhoden, supra note 1, at 385-86.
62 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Okin to consider the issue. 101 S. Ct.
1972 (1981).
63 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
64 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Okin on a federalism issue. The Supreme
Court must resolve whether a federal court can formulate and implement guidelines for state
authorities without violating federalism principles. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380
(1976) (federalism principles apply where state agency or local government and federal courts
are involved). The Court has stated that only when "[state] authorities fail in their affirma-
[Vol. 57:406]
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III. The Procedures to Protect the Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drug Treatment
A. Recent Decisions
The First Circuit in Okin examined the district court's proce-
dures for protecting the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs for all
mental patients in emergencies and for incompetent mental patients
in nonemergencies. The court rejected the district court's standard
for emergency medication, that there must be a "substantial likeli-
hood" of physical harm to the patient or others if the hospital does
not medicate the patient. 65 The court instructed the district court to
design different emergency procedures, suggesting that they should
not give physicians unlimited discretion in exercising their profes-
sional judgment, 66 and that, at a minimum, a qualified physician
should determine in each case that medication is necessary.
67
The court then considered the district court's standards for med-
icating incompetent mental patients in non-emergencies. 68 After a
court adjudicates a mental patient incompetent, the court appoints a
guardian for that patient. The court affirmed the district court's rul-
ing that this guardian may exercise the incompetent mental patient's
right to refuse antipsychotic drugs in a non-emergency, but refused
to require guardian permission for each treatment decision involving
tive obligations" can a federal court "correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective
interests, the condition that offends the Constitution." The nature of the violation determines
the remedy's scope. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1971)
(Court formulated guidelines for implementing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
Also, "[A] school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases involving
the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right." Id. at 15-16.
Finally, district courts can retain jurisdiction to ensure that the remedy protects the constitu-
tional right. Id. at 21 (jurisdiction retained to ensure no perpetuation or re-establishment of
the dual school system).
If a federal court thus finds a constitutional violation, it has the authority to establish an
appropriate remedy applicable to state authorities. A federal court's establishing procedures
protecting a mental patient's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs is such a remedy. However,
the Supreme Court has never decided whether the federal court must frst give the state offi-
cials a chance to remedy the constitutional violation before the court establishes a remedy.
Thus, since courts have only recently established the constitutional right to refuse antip-
sychotic drug treatment, federalism principles may require that courts give state officials this
chance.
65 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1365 (D. Mass. 1979).
66 The court suggested that the need to prevent violence must outweigh the possibility of
harm to the mental patient, and the doctor must rule out reasonable alternatives before forci-
bly medicating a mental patient in an emergency. 634 F.2d 650, 656 (1st Cir. 1980).
67 Id. The court also ordered the district court to expand the definition of emergency to
situations where the mental patient's mental health is in danger. Id. at 659-60.
68 Id. at 658-59.
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drugs.69 In making treatment decisions for incompetent mental pa-
tients, the court ordered hospitals to use the "substituted judgment"
standard.70 The court also ordered the hospitals to provide minimal
procedural requirements to ensure that this standard is met, such as
periodic review of patients' medical histories by a non-treating doc-
tor. The court remanded the case to the district court to design addi-
tional procedural safeguards.
7'
Unlike the Massachusetts hospitals in Okin, the New Jersey Divi-
sion of Mental Health and Hospitals in Rennie had issued regulations
(the Bulletin) providing for hospital review of a mental patient's re-
fusal to accept medication.7 2 The Bulletin authorizes the hospital's
chief executive officer to consent to a doctor's administering medicine
recommended by the mental patient's doctor in an emergency.
7 3
The hospital may medicate the mental patient upon the doctor's or-
der alone if waiting for the chief executive officer's consent will jeop-
ardize the patient's life.
7 4
The Bulletin then outlines the procedures doctors must follow
when an involuntary mental patient refuses prescribed psychotropic
medicine. The doctor must first attempt to explain to the mental
patient his diagnosis, the reasons for prescribing that medication, and
the disadvantages of alternative treatments.7 5 If the mental patient
still refuses, the patient's "treatment team" 76 must meet, with the pa-
tient present if he is able. The treatment team then tries to formulate
a treatment plan acceptable to the mental patient and the team.77
If the mental patient still refuses medication after this meeting,
the hospital must follow different procedures for incompetent and
69 The court reasoned that this requirement was impractical, incapable of enforcement,
and, most importantly, might create a tendency for doctors not to treat patients because of the
inconvenience in seeking the guardian's permission. Id. at 660-61.
70 The state must try to make the same decision that it thinks the individual would make
if he were competent. Id. at 661.
71 Id.
72 Administrative Bulletin 78-3 (March 1, 1978), reprinted in 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1148-51
(D.N.J. 1978). The Bulletin acknowledged that voluntary patients have the right to refuse
treatment. 462 F. Supp. at 1149; see In re Hospitalization ofB., 152 N.J. Super. 231, 383 A.2d
760 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1977).
73 The Bulletin, in section II(A), defined an emergency as a situation where medication is
necessary "in order to prevent the death of or serious consequences to a patient." 462 F.
Supp. at 1149.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1150.
76 The "treatment team" consists of the treating doctor and others at the hospital who
deal with the patient, such as psychologists, social workers, and nurses. The team's opinion is
only a recommendation to the treating doctor. 476 F. Supp. at 1303.
77 462 F. Supp. at 1150.
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competent mental patients. For an incompetent mental patient, the
doctor must attempt to secure the guardian's consent. If the guard-
ian, after reasonable notice and request for consent, refuses or ne-
glects to consent, the chief executive officer may consent to doctors'
administering the medicine.
78
If an involuntary mental patient has not been adjudicated in-
competent, the medical director or his designee must conduct a per-
sonal examination of the patient's record. If the medical director
agrees that forced medication is proper, the doctor can administer it.
The Bulletin also authorizes, but does not require, the medical direc-
tor to consult an independent psychiatrist for an evaluation of the
patient's need for medication. If the outside consultant does not rec-
ommend medication, the medical director must address the consult-
ant's recommendations and conclusions in his report for the mental
patient's records. The medical director must also review each week
the programs of involuntary mental patients refusing medication.
7 9
The hospitals also followed a practice, not required by the Bulletin,
in which the director or other doctor of the Division of Mental
Health and Hospitals reviewed all compulsory medication cases.80
The Third Circuit held that the Bulletin procedures satisfied
due process, 8' reversing the district court's decision that the proce-
dures were insufficient. 82 The court essentially told the district court
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1150-51.
80 476 F. Supp. at 1303.
81 The court based its analysis on the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), which outlined the required due process protections for state agency
proceedings. Matews requires courts to analyze three factors before deciding whether state
procedures satisfy due process: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous
decision through the state's procedures, as well as the value of any alternative safeguards; and
(3) the governmental interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens that other procedu-
ral requirements would impose. Id. at 335.
Applying these three factors to the hospitals' procedures, the court found that although
there was a private interest at stake, the mental patients' right to refuse antipsychotic drugs,
the minor risk of error presented by the state hospitals' procedures, and the substantial bur-
dens placed on the state hospitals by the district court's plan outweighed that private interest.
The court approved New Jersey's regulatory system and rejected the district court's plan. 653
F.2d 836, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1981).
82 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). The district court had found that state hospitals ignored
the Bulletin, overused the emergency exception, failed to report refusals to take medication,
intimidated the mental patients into accepting medication, and failed to inform mental pa-
tients of their rights. The court also found that the medical director's reviews of treatment
refusal cases were not independent and objective. 476 F. Supp. at 1303-05. The district court
ordered the state hospitals to obtain written consent from mental patients each time they
prescribed psychotropic drugs in a nonemergency, and to set up a Patient Advocates system
to assist patients in exercising their rights. The court also ordered an informal review by an
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not to rewrite the Bulletin, but to enforce it. If after a reasonable
time the court finds that the procedures are not working,
3 it will
explore other methods to protect the mental patients' constitutional
rights.
84
B. Analysis and Suggested Procedures
The courts in Okin and Rennie took opposite approaches in deter-
mining what procedures were necessary to protect the right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs. The First Circuit in Okin decided that the fed-
eral judiciary should determine what procedures the hospitals would
use. The Third Circuit in Rennie reviewed and upheld as satisfying
due process requirements the state hospitals' regulations.
Both approaches can be criticized. Because courts lack expertise
in mental health treatment, it is questionable whether they should
write hospital procedures. Courts also tend to structure any proce-
dure as an adversary process, creating stress and competition be-
tween mental patients and their doctors, rather than encouraging
treatment.85 The First Circuit's approach may also violate federal-
ism principles, which give state authorities the primary responsibility
for solving these problems.86 But if courts give hospitals total control
over writing procedures, the hospitals may give themselves too much
discretion over mental patients' treatment decisions. For example, in
Rennie, the Bulletin does not require state hospitals to follow the
guardian's decision against medicating an incompetent mental pa-
tient.8 7 The Bulletin also does not require, but permits, state hospi-
tals to consult a neutral decisionmaker.88 The state hospitals,
therefore, have almost total control of the mental patients' treatment
decisions.
One commentator offers a compromise that would give mental
patients their constitutional right without burdening the state with
judicial proceedings. She proposes that an administrative officer,
rather than a judge, hold hearings limited to the issue of incompe-
tency to make treatment decisions. If the hearing officer finds that
independent psychiatrist before a doctor forcibly medicated a mental patient. 476 F. Supp.
at 1311-12.
83 If the procedures are not working, then hospitals are violating patients' constitutional
rights, and a court's designing new procedures may not violate federalism principles. See note
64 supra.
84 653 F.2d at 851.
85 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979).
86 See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
87 See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
88 See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
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the mental patient is incompetent to make a treatment decision, the
officer makes that decision. This procedure promotes consistency,
knowledgeability, and neutrality in such decisions. 89
State hospitals should be allowed to formulate procedures pro-
tecting the constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drug treat-
ment, and courts should review the procedures for due process
violations. All state hospitals, however, should also be required to
provide involuntary mental patients with two other rights: (1) that
hospitals inform a mental patient or his guardian of his right to re-
fuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs in a non-emergency; 90 and
(2) that state hospitals give mental patients an informal review of
their decision to refuse treatment by an administrative officer, in-
dependent from the hospital bureaucracy. 91
If the Constitution entitles suspected criminals to know their
rights,92 it should entitle mental patients in similar custody, but inno-
cent of any crime, to the same right.93 The right to refuse anti-
psychotic drugs is worthless unless the patient, as well as his family
and guardian, knows it exists. Therefore, before medicating a pa-
tient in a nonemergency, the doctor should be required to tell the
mental patient that he can refuse the antipsychotic drugs.94
An independent officer's determination that forced medication
is necessary guarantees that state hospitals do not abuse their discre-
tion to administer drugs. The officer should hold informal hearings,
giving the mental patient and the hospital an opportunity to express
their opinions and present relevant information. The hearing should
not be an adversary contest, but an informal discussion of what is the
mental patient's best treatment. Finally, courts should oversee state
hospitals, ensuring that the hospitals give mental patients these rights
and that any protective procedures provide the mental patient with
due process. 95
The right of a mental patient to refuse treatment with anti-
89 See Rhoden, supra note 1, at 406-08.
90 See note 61 supra (compelling state interest justifies infringement of right in an
emergency).
91 See note 89 and accompanying text supra. This officer should be a mental health pro-
fessional, such as a psychiatrist or psychologist.
92 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
93 See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
94 If the mental patient is incompetent, the doctor should be required to inform his
guardian of this right.
95 In states such as Massachusetts, however, which do not give voluntary mental patients
the right to refuse treatment, voluntary mental patients may not share these rights. In such a
jurisdiction, the patient must leave the state hospital if he refuses treatment. See note 4 supira.
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psychotic drugs is constitutionally protected. The recent decisions in
Okin and Rennie affirm this right and formulate procedures to protect
it. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Okin to determine defin-
itively whether this right exists, and, if so, whether the First Circuit
erred in ordering the district court, rather than the state hospitals, to
formulate protective procedures. Rennie upheld the hospitals' proce-
dures as affording due process. Neither decision goes far enough,
however, in protecting mental patients' rights. State hospitals should
be required to inform mental patients of thei7right to refuse anti-
psychotic drugs in a nonemergency and to review any mental pa-
tient's treatment refusal in an informal hearing by an administrative
officer.
Perhaps the most important consideration, however, is the
mental patient's well-being. Although antipsychotic drugs have a
tremendous effect on a mental patient's physical and emotional well-
being, they are often never asked the simple question, "[H]ow does
the medication agree with you?"'96 Courts, hospitals, and legislatures
should keep that question in mind when they decide if a mental pa-
tient has a constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic





96 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 936 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
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Gifts-THE INCOME TAx TREATMENT OF NET GIFTS
Frequently, gifts will be conditioned on the payment of the gift
tax by the recipient. Such a transaction has been termed a net gift.1
The income tax effect of such a conditioned transfer has caused a
split in the courts. In Diedrich v. Commissioner,2 the Eighth Circuit
held that such a transfer confers income on the transferor. On sub-
stantially similar facts, the Sixth Circuit in Owen v. Commissioner3 held
that no income tax liability results from such a transfer.
It seems clear that an economic benefit has been conferred upon
the donor to the extent the gift tax paid exceeds the adjusted basis of
the gift and the economic benefit test established in Diedich should
be the controlling test.
4
I. State of the Law
Two clear lines of cases emerge in this area. Owen has sprung
from the Sixth Circuit's seminal case of Turner v. Commissioner,5 subse-
quently followed by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in Hirst v. Commis-
sioner6 and Estate of Davis v. Commissioner.7 These decisions find that a
1 Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.
3216 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981). Only that portion of the value of the property transferred which
exceeds the amount of the gift taxes due on the transfer is considered to have been transferred
with donative intent, and therefore characterized as a gift, subject to gift taxes. Id. at 501 n.8.
2 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981).
3 81-2 USTC (CCH) 9509 (6th Cir. 1981), ajfg 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 272 (1973).
4 I.R.C. § 1001(a) provides: "The gain from the sale or other disposition of property
shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis." Since a gift
may be viewed as a "disposition," the amount of the gift tax paid by the donee may be
viewed as an "amount realized therefrom." These statutory terms explain the reason for con-
tending that the benefit to the donor equals the excess of the gift tax liability over the prop-
erty's adjusted basis.
5 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969), af'gper cuyiar 49 T.C. 356 (1968). In Turner, the tax-
payer transferred shares of stock to her children and to trustees of her grandchildren pursuant
to an agreement by the children to reimburse her for the gift tax and an agreement by the
trustees to reimburse her out of the trust corpora. The court found that the taxpayer realized
no income. Id. at 753.
6 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aJfg 63 T.C. 307 (1974). Mrs. Hirst, an 81-
year-old widow, owned a one-half interest in non-income producing undeveloped real estate,
the remainder of which was owned by her deceased husband's estate. Besides the real estate,
Mrs. Hirst owned the house she was living in, a one-half interest in another house being used
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net gift transaction yields no income tax liability. The Diedrich deci-
sion by the Eighth Circuit, however, is the harbinger of a new line of
cases arguing that where there is an economic benefit, there should"
be taxation. Predecessors in this line of cases are the Second and
Seventh Circuit decisions in Estate of Levine v. Commissioner8 and Evan-
gelista v. Commissioner.9
While the gift tax consequences of a net gift are clear-cut,' 0
Diedrich and Owen have perpetuated the division regarding the in-
come tax treatment of net gifts." Diedrich consolidated two cases,
both involving gifts of low basis, highly appreciated securities by the
taxpayer to family members' 2 expressly conditioned on the donee's
promise to pay all resulting gift taxes. In each case, the Commis-
sioner determined that the taxpayer realized income from the donee's
as an office building, and about $25,000 in a savings account. Partially to eliminate the
burden of yearly property taxes, she transferred this interest to her son and his family. Be-
cause the property transfers would have required a combined federal and state tax payment
in excess of $85,000, the donees were to pay all gift taxes. 572 F.2d at 431 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting).
7 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972), afg per curiam 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1974). The tax-
payer made a gift of stock to his son and two trusts on the condition that they assume and pay
all gift taxes from the transaction. The court held that a condition requiring the donees to
pay the resulting gift taxes does not alter the result that the transfer constituted a gift.
8 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980), aJ'g 72 T.C. 307 (1974). The taxpayer made a gift of real
estate encumbered by non-recourse mortgages to a trust for the benefit of his three grand-
children. The donee trust assumed the mortgage, the taxpayer's obligation to pay the ac-
crued interest and the real estate operating expenses for the prior year. The court held that
the donee's assumption and payment of expenses incurred in connection with the donated
real estate for which the donor was personally liable constituted income to the donor.
9 629 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1980), affg 71 T.C. 1057 (1979). The taxpayer transferred his
interest in 33 autos subject to a security interest held by the bank to a trust established for the
sole benefit of his two children, and the trustee (taxpayer's wife) assumed primary liability for
payment of the remaining note balance. The court held that the transaction was taxable to
the taxpayer to the extent the liability assumed by the trustee exceeded the adjusted basis in
the autos transferred. This case is not discussed further in this article, but merely illustrates
the 7th Circuit's willingness to follow an "economic benefit" test. See notes 66-92 and accom-
panying text infra.
10 In Sarah Helen Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), the Tax Court held that, in determin-
ing the net value of the gift (upon which the gift tax is assessed), the amount of the gift tax
shall be excluded from the gross value of the gift as a retained interest. 17 T.C. at 1357. The
court reasoned that, since the donor did not intend the amount of the property's value neces-
sary to pay the gift tax to be a gift, that amount was not taxable as "value of. . .property
passing from the donor." Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.3 (1944). 17 T.C. at 1357.
The Commissioner later acquiesced in the Harrison decision. 1952-2 C.B. 2; Rev. Rul. 81-
232, 1971-1 C.B. 275. The Commissioner requires net gifts to be expressly or impliedly condi-
tioned upon donee assumption of the gift tax liability. Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 C.B. at 276.
11 See notes 38-92 and accompanying text infra.
12 The taxpayers in Diedrich transferred stock outright to their son and in trust for the
benefit of their daughters. The taxpayer in UnitedMissouri Bank, the companion case, made a
gift outright to her son. 643 F.2d at 500 n.3.
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payment of the gift taxes assessed on the transfer to the extent the gift
tax exceeded the donor's basis in the transferred property.' 3
In Diedrich, the Commissioner argued that Crane v. Commissioner'
4
and Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner'5 established the principle
that non-cash consideration received is nonetheless realized income. 6
Since the donor must pay federal gift taxes,1 7 the Commissioner con-
tended that the donor realized income in the amount of gift taxes
paid by the donee.' 8
The taxpayers in Diedick argued that Crane and Old Colony Trust
had not previously been applied to a net gift situation where the do-
nor personally received no money or other property representing a
portion of the gift property's appreciated value. '9 The taxpayers also
relied upon the Tax Court cases which followed Tumer.
20
Though the Diedrich and Turer facts were indistinguishable, the
Eighth Circuit declined to follow Turner, stating that the correct ap-
proach was taken in the post-Tumer cases ofJohnson v. Commissioner2'
13 Id. at 500.
14 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The taxpayer in Crane transferred to an unrelated party a building
subject to a mortgage. The court found that the taxpayer had realized income, stating:
A mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the property subject
to the mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a benefit in the amount
of the mortgage. . . . If he transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is
as real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt
in an equal amount had been assumed by another.
Id. at 14.
15 279 U.S. 716 (1929). The taxpayer, as officer of his company, acquiesced to the com-
pany's payment of his personal federal and state income taxes. The Court found that the
company's payment constituted additional income to the employee, stating, "[t]he discharge
by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed." Id. at
729.
16 643 F.2d at 501.
17 I.R.C. § 2502(d) states "[t]he tax imposed by section 2501 [the gift tax] shall be paid
by the donor."
18 643 F.2d at 501.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 504. The Eighth Circuit noted that the Turner rationale had been followed in all
subsequent tax court decisions presenting similar facts. Id. at 502. These included Owen;
Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir.
July 31, 1978); Hirst; and Estate of Davis. 643 F.2d at 504.
21 59 T.C. 791 (1973), aj'd, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
Dr. Johnson borrowed $200,000 from a bank without recourse and secured the note with
stock having a fair market value of $500,000 and a basis of about $11,000. The taxpayer then
transferred the stock into an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children, and the trustees
replaced the taxpayer's note with their own, secured by the same stock. The taxpayer paid
$150,000 in gift tax from the $200,000 original note proceeds, leaving him with $50,000 cash.
The court held that the taxpayer realized income on amounts by which the loan proceeds




and Levine. 22 Althoughjohnson did not involve a net gift, the Sixth
Circuit stated that regardless of the characterization of the transac-
tion, each taxpayer received something of value from the transfer,
resulting in gross income.23 In Levine, which likewise did not involve
a net gift, the Second Circuit held that the donor realized gain to the
extent his obligation assumed by the donee exceeded the donor's ad-
justed basis in the transferred property.24 The Diedrich court found
no meaningful distinction between the pre-existing encumbrances in
Levine and Johnson and those arising at the time of transfer. 25
Notwithstanding "stare decisis and fair play, ' 26 the Eighth Cir-
cuit ruled that the taxpayer's reliance upon the Turner line of cases
did not control its decision. 27 The court explained that when these
net gifts were made, the Eighth Circuit had not yet determined the
income tax consequences of such gifts and that "claims of reliance [in
federal tax law] are to be given little weight.
' 28
Soon after the Commissioner's Eighth Circuit victory in Died-
rich, the Sixth Circuit announced a taxpayer victory in Owen on facts
indistinguishable from those in Diedich. In Owen, married taxpayers
transferred highly appreciated, low basis stock into trust for their
grandchildren. The trusts then borrowed money from the trustee
bank to pay all federal and state gift taxes on the transfers in accord-
ance with the trust instrument.
29
The Commissioner abandoned his previous "part sale, part gift"
argument 3 0 arguing instead that because a transaction's substance
must prevail over its form, Johnson required the taxpayers to recog-
22 634 F.2d 12. See note 8 supra.
23 495 F.2d at 1083.
24 634 F.2d at 17. The court consideredJohnson to have "effectively overruled" Turner.
Id.
25 643 F.2d at 503-04. See also text accompanying note 88 infa.
26 Id. at 504. "Stare decisis and fair play" were important reasons for two Tax Court
cases upholding Turner, Owen v. Commissioner, 81-2 USTC (CCH) 9509, afg' 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) 272 (1973), and Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665 (1978), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. July 31, 1978). Estate ofHen i has been taken off the 6th Circuit calen-
dar pending a Supreme Court decision in Diedrich, see note 2 supra.
27 See note 28 in/ta.
28 643 F.2d at 504 (quoting Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
29 81-2 USTC at 87,658.
30 The "part sale, part gift" theory splits a gift of highly appreciated, low basis property
into two parts: (1) a nontaxable gift to the extent of the value of the transferred property; and
(2) income to the donor to the extent of gift taxes assessable to the donor, but paid by the
donee. Thus, the excess of the gift tax paid by the donee over the basis of the property
transferred to the donee constitutes capital gain to the donor. See 572 F.2d at 433 (Bryan, J.,
dissenting).
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nize income.3t The Sixth Circuit sustained the Tax Court's finding
against the Commissoner, but rejected the Tax Court's reasoning.
The Tax Court had followed its decision in Estate ofHenr. v. Commis-
sioner32 and held that the net gifts bore no adverse income tax conse-
quences to the taxpayer-donor. The Tax Court ruled that since the
taxpayer intended only to make a gift, rather than a sale, the transac-
tion was a nontaxable pure net gift.33 The Sixth Circuit noted the
split in the circuits that developed when Diedich was decided and
concluded that it must follow Turner if it was still good law.34 In
addition, the court found Crane and Old Colony Trust persuasive35 and
reasoned that discharging a gift tax liability in Hirst and Turer had
the same impact upon the donor as discharging the pre-existing debt
injohnson.36 Finally, after stating that "the critical fact was that the
donor received something of value and it made absolutely no differ-
ence to what use the money was put,"37 the court did an about-face
and held for the taxpayer on the basis of stare decisis, upholding Tur-
ner once again.
II. Principal Theories
Two theories prevail regarding net gifts. One may broadly be
called the "donor's intent" theory, and illustrates the current major-
31 Johnson set forth three theories under which a taxpayer-donor could be found to have
realized income. For an examination of these theories, see notes 79-84 and accompanying
text inrfa.
32 69 T.C. 665 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. July 31, 1978). In Estate of
Henry, the donor made gifts of appreciated stock to trusts for her grandchildren. Acting upon
the donor's wishes, the trusts borrowed funds to pay the gift tax, using the stock as collateral.
The total gift taxes paid exceeded the donor's basis in the securities transferred, but neither
the donor nor the trustees intended the transaction to be a sale in whole or in part. The court
stated, "[w]hen taxpayer made the trust gifts, she did not intend to sell her stock." Id. at 674.
The court then held:
In these circumstances, under the principle of stare decisis and fair play with a
taxpayer who has relied upon our higher opinions. . . we must follow the Turner
case and hold that [the taxpayer] did not realize taxable income as a result of the
conditional transfers.
Id. at 675.
33 81-2 USTC at 87,659. The opinion defines a net gift as "a gift of property subject to
some encumbrance or obligation which may be either pre-existing or which arises at the time
of the gift." Id. (noting Suwalsky, Net Giat.-A Critical Look at Johnson v. Commissioner, TAx
MAN. (BNA) 75-05, at 2 (1975)). The opinion then explains that the "pure" net gifts referred
to are "gifts of unencumbered property to trust conditioned on the donee's payment of the
gift tax." 81-2 USTC at 87,659.
34 Id. at 87,662.
35 Id. at 87,663.
36 Id.
37 Id.; 495 F.2d at 1083.
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ity rule. The second, more recent theory is the "economic benefit"
theory, which represents the emerging trend.
A. Donor-s Intent Theory
The problem of income tax treatment of net gifts originated in
connection with gifts to trusts where the donor's gift tax was paid
with trust income. In this situation, the courts taxed the donor on
the theory that the trust income had been reserved for his benefit.3 8
Turner could not be resolved by application of the retained inter-
est theory, since the donees paid the donor's gift tax either from
available cash or sale of part of the gifted securities, not from trust
income. The Commissioner in Turner planned to litigate the case
based upon a part sale, part gift39 argument, but in his brief the
Commissioner conceded that the transfers to the trust donees were
not sales and the Tax Court rejected the part sale, part gift argument
38 Set 81-2 USTC at 87,659; 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 389, 391 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
RUTGERS Comment]. Principal early cases include Estate of Scheaffer, 377 T.C. 99 (1961),
aj'd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963); Clifton B. Russel, 5 T.C. 974
(1945), appeal dimissed, 154 F.2d 829 (Ist Cir. 1946); Estate of Staley, 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942),
afd,_ 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943).
This precept is reflected in I.R.C. § 677(a), and was instrumental in the decision in
Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971), appeal dismissed, (6th Cir. 1972). I.R.C.
§ 677(a) provides: "The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust...
whose income. . . in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party. . . may be (1) dis-
tributed to the grantor. . . [or] (2) held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor
... " In Krause, the taxpayer transferred property to three trusts created for the benefit of
his grandchildren, and the trustees agreed to pay the resulting gift tax liabilities. The trustees
were given discretion to use the trust income, proceeds of sale of corpus, or borrowed funds for
this purpose. The Tax Court held that the taxpayers received taxable income prior to the
payment of the gift tax liabilities, but did not realize any other income as a result of the
payment of such taxes. The court's obvious emphasis was on the trustee's control of the trust
income:
Where a person transfers property to a trust and, as a condition to the transfer,
the trustee agrees to pay the resulting gift tax liability, the donor is taxable on any
trust income which the trustee may use for that purpose. Within the meaning of
section 677, he is treated as an owner of a portion of the trust because its income
• . . may be used to discharge his legal obligation [the gift tax]. Under section 671,
the donor is taxable on the income. . . which may be used to discharge his legal
obligation to pay the gift tax.
56 T.C. at 1245-46.
Thus, even though the Krause court rejected the Commissioner's "part sale, part gift"
argument on the authority of Turner, id. at 1248, this case stands for the proposition that trust
income which may be used to discharge the donor's legal obligations may be properly taxed
to him, rather than for the proposition that Turner was correctly decided. The Krause case is
notable in that the Commissioner abandoned the distinction between individual and trust
donees and argued "part sale, part gift" in both instances. 81-2 USTC at 87,660.
39 See note 30 supra.
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as to the individual donees.40 The court treated the property trans-
fers as net gifts, reasoning that the donor had intended to give the
value of the shares less the value of the gift tax payable on the trans-
fers.4 ' Thus, the donor "retained" use of that portion of the gift
equal to the gift tax liability.
42
The Turner rationale precluded a finding of a taxable gain since
the donor intended only to make a net gift. The donor's intent is de-
termined from the facts of each case, but a strong presumption of
wholly gratuitous intent exists.
43
The intent standard for donor taxation became widely accepted
in the 1970's after it was followed in Estate of Davz' v. Commissioner.
44
In the 1978 Hirsl decision, the Fourth Circuit found that the facts
determined that the taxpayer received no income.45 The Hirst court
cited Turner as the basis of its decision, 46 and stated the familiar Tur-
ner test, that the predominant fact is that the taxpayer intended not
to sell but only to make a gift.4 7 The court then added a new twist,
finding that no economic gain accrued to the taxpayer, except release
from the normal tax burden of a real estate owner.48 The court thus
leaned toward the economic benefit test as a second criterion for de-
termining the income tax liability of the donor. The Hirst court ac-
knowledged the validity of the economic benefit test by stating that
discharge of another's obligation produces income,49 but added that
40 49 T.C. at 362-63.
41 Id. at 363; 410 F.2d at 753.
42 One commentator proposes still another "retained interest" theory whereby the donor
treated as retaining a property interest would recognize a gain or loss on the disposition of this
interest. A net gift giver would encounter the same income tax liability as a donor who
physically divides his property and sells part of it to pay the gift tax. This retained interest
result presumably reflects both the substance of the net gift transaction and the parties' intent,
since the donor merely wants to make a gift conditioned upon the donee's assumption of the
gift tax liability, rather than to sell the property to the donee. The commentator notes, how-
ever, that the courts are unlikely to adopt this retained interest analysis because it is more
disadvantageous to the taxpayer than is the IRS's part sale, part gift position. 63 CORNELL
L. REv. 1074, 1086, 1088-89 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CORNELL Comment].
43 See RUTGERS Comment, supra note 38, at 394 & n.34.
44 See note 7 supra.
45 572 F.2d at 431. See note 6 supra.
46 572 F.2d at 431.
47 Id. at 430.
48 Id. (emphasis added). The majority indicates that relief from the responsibility for the
payment of accruing real estate taxes is not such an economic advantage to Mrs. Hirst that
she should be taxed on its receipt. Id. at 430 n.9. The court seems to place weight on the fact
that no pre-existing liability was present when it observed that she received nothing by virtue
of the transaction, but was simply not worse off. Id. at 431. This observation ignores the
substance of the transaction. See notes 75, 88-89 and accompanying text inrfa.
49 572 F.2d at 431.
[December 1981]
RECENT DECISIONS
the relationship between the parties and the existence of other obli-
gations are equally important considerations.
50
Hirst identified three criteria as determinative of whether a net
gift results in taxable income to the donor: (1) the subjective intent
of the donor in making the transfer,51 (2) the economic benefit to the
donor from the transfer,52 and (3) other subjective considerations.
53
Even though the intent and economic benefit tests5 4 indicate that the
transferor realized taxable income, other subjective factors, such as
the age or financial position of the donor, may militate against in-
come tax liability.
55
Recently, Heng followed Turner56 but justified its holding on
stare decisis and fair play.5 7 Although the Henry court reiterated the
idea that the taxpayer did not intend to sell the property,58 it seemed
more impressed with the rejection of the Commissioner's part sale,
part gift argument by a plurality of the courts of appeals.
Owen is the most recent standard-bearer for Turner, although dic-
tum in the case casts doubt on Turner's posture as precedent. 59 The
Tax Court followed Henry and ruled under the donor's intent doc-
trine of Turer that the taxpayers intended only to make a gift.6 0 The
Sixth Circuit declined to wholeheartedly endorse the donor's intent
theory adopted by the Tax Court. 6' Instead, the appellate court
stated that under the Old Colony Trust and Crane decisions, discharge
of a debt is a benefit to the taxpayer and receipt of a benefit is
50 Id.
51 Id. at 430.
52 Id. at 431.
53 Id.
54 The Hirst court found that the donor received no economic benefit, see note 48 supra,
but in light of subsequent decisions such as Diedrich and Owen (holding that the relief from
gift tax liability ir a benefit), the court would probably not continue to believe this finding.
55 The Hirst court in fact found Mrs. Hirst's age and financial position, see note 6 supra,
to be persuasive factors militating against imposing tax liability upon her. See 572 F.2d at
431.
56 The court noted thatJohnson had limited Turner to its facts, rather than overruling it,
and assumed that Turner was to apply to future indistinguishable fact situations. One com-
mentator has advanced the idea that the limited affirmance of Turner may have been in-
tended to restrict the holding to the particular taxpayer in Turner, supporting the
Commissioner's position in the Hirst appeal. RUTGERS Comment, supra note 38, at 404 &
n.l1; Hirst, 572 F.2d 427 (1978), Brief for Appellant at 17 n.7. See also note 78 infra.
57 69 T.C. 665. See notes 26 & 32 supra.
58 69 T.C. at 674.
59 See 81-2 USTC at 87,661, 87,664.
60 See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
61 81-2 USTC at 87,663.
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equivalent to receipt of income. 62 Thus, the donor realizes income to
the extent that the donee satisfies the donor's debt.63 The court hesi-
tated, however, to rely upon the intent standard, and resolved the
case by concluding that stare decisis compelled a verdict for the tax-
payer.64 Since stare decisis serves as the life-support system for Tur-
ner's donor intent theory, the theory is on less than solid ground. 65
B. Economic Benefit Theory
Courts have recently applied the economic benefit theory to net
gift questions. The theory, as applied to individuals, originated in
the part sale, part gift argument advanced by the Commissioner in
Turner.66 Before Turner, the Commissioner had invoked section 677
of the Internal Revenue Code67 which attributed to the donor in-
come from the trust used to pay gift taxes. However, in Turner only
small amounts of current trust income were used to pay the gift taxes,
since property sales proceeds and available cash covered most of the
liabilities. 68 The Commissioner therefore advanced his part sale, part
gift theory, contending that the donor realized income to the extent
that the gift tax liability of the donor exceeded his adjusted basis in
the transferred property. 69 The court rejected this theory and held
the transfer to be a nontaxable event.
70
The Tax Court also rejected the part sale, part gift characteriza-
tion in Krause v. Commissioner7 1 and Davis72 before it was accepted by




65 See Winston F.C. Guest, 77.2 T.C.M. (P-H) (1981).
In Guest, the Tax Court noted that it had continued to adhere to Turner in the interest of
fair play and stare decisis, despite the Commissioner's continued opposition and the Johnson
opinion. The court noted that Diedrich had rejected the Turner approach, but declined to rule
upon the vitality of the Turner doctrine since a net gift situation was not presented. Id. at 12-
77 n.10.
66 See note 30 supra.
67 I.R.C. § 677(a) provides: "The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of
a trust. . . whose income. . . in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party. . . may
be (1) distributed to the grantor . . . [or] (2) held or accumulated for future distribution to
the grantor. . . ." See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
68 49 T.C. at 359-60; 572 F.2d at 428-29.
69 See note 30 supra.
70 See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
71 56 T.C. 1242 (1971), appeal dismissed, (6th Cir. 1972).
72 469 F.2d 694. See note 7 supra.
73 The appellate court noted that whether the transaction was described as "part sale,
part gift" or a "net gift" was not important. The important thing was the taxpayer's receiv-
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replaced the part sale, part gift theory with the economic benefit
test.74 The appellate court looked to the substance of the transaction;
namely, the donor had received money debt-free and used part of
that money to pay the gift taxes on his transfer of stock into the
trust.75 The same result would have occurred if the Turner facts were
before the court, that is, the $150,000 would have been viewed as
receipt of the donee's payment of the donor's gift tax liability. 76 Us-
ing the economic benefit rationale, the court found that payment of a
donor's gift tax liability by the donee constituted income to the do-
nor.77 After examining the facts of Turner and reaching a different
result, the court limited Turner to its peculiar facts.
78
Thejohnson court advanced three theories upon which liability
could be based. First, under section 61 of the Code,79 the $200,000
received by the taxpayer free of any repayment obligation was gross
income, regardless of how the money was used.80 Second, because
section 2502(d) imposes the legal obligation on the donor to pay gift
taxes, the donee's payment of the donor's liability constitutes income
to the donor under the principles expressed in Old Colony Tnist.81
Third, under the Crane doctrine, the donor realized income when he
disposed of the debt by transferring the encumbered property into
trust.8 2 TheJohnson court stated that Crane governed the transaction
because the taxpayers received cash without personal liability to re-
pay the notes.8 3 The court thus rejected Turner's subjective intent test
and replaced it with the more objective economic benefit test. The
Johnson court also noted the greater possibility, under the economic
ing "something of value" upon the transfer. 495 F.2d at 1083. Therefore, the Commissioner's
"part sale, part gift" rationale was explicitly accepted only by the Tax Court in Johnson. See
Johnson, 59 T.C. at 817.
74 495 F.2d at 1083.
75 See notes 21 & 23 and accompanying text su/pra.
76 495 F.2d at 1083.
77 Id.
78 In Turner, the Commissioner conceded that the gifts to the trusts were not "sales."
However, the Commissioner made no concessions respecting the gifts to the individual donees
in the case. 81-2 USTC at 87,661 n.10. (The case involved gifts to the taxpayer's children
directly and to her grandchildren in trust. 410 F.2d at 752). In light of the Commissioneres
concessions, some courts have interpretedJohnson's limitation of Turner as applying to all indi-
vidual and trust donees. See note 56 sufpra. Others have regarded the limitation as applying
only to the individuals in the case. Id.
79 I.R.C. § 61(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income
means all income from whatever source derived ..
80 495 F.2d at 1083.
81 Id. See a/so note 15 supira.
82 495 F.2d at 1083. See also note 14 supra.
83 495 F.2d at 1083.
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benefit test, of applying the Tax Code equitably to basically similar
transactions.
84
In Levine, the Second Circuit followed Johnson,85 holding that
the donee's assumption and payment of expenses for which the donor
was personally liable on the donated property gave rise to donor in-
come. The court viewed the gift tax as any other personal liability of
the donor, and found income upon the donee's payment of the tax.
86
The next examination of the economic benefit theory occurred
in Diedrich ,87 decided a year after Levine. The Eighth Circuit stated
the economic benefit test concisely: "It makes no difference whether
[the taxpayer] receives the benefit in the form of relief of encum-
brance, or in the form of relief of tax liability: the determinative factor is
the receipt of the benefit. 188 Looking to the substance of the transaction,
the court noted that the transferor was actually receiving something
in return for his gift transfer, and concluded that the transferor's in-
tent could not change the economic effect of the event.89
An Iowa district court recently followed Diedrich's economic
benefit test. In Molinaro v. United States9° the court held that donors of
stock received a taxable benefit to the extent that the gift tax liability
assumed by the donees exceeded the donor's adjusted basis in the
stock.91 The Molinaro court viewed Diedrich as overruling prior Tax
Court decisions92 which, consistent with the Turner rationale, had
permitted income tax-free treatment of net gifts.
84 The court noted the difficulty involved in depending upon hindsight determinations of
actual intent to establish income tax consequences, and the different treatment that would
result when taxpayers doing the same actions intend different things. Id. at 1083 n.6.
85 The Hirst dissent also stated that the Turner decision was wrong in holding that a net
gift gave rise to no taxable event for income tax purposes, 572 F.2d at 437 (Thomsen, J.,
dissenting), and concluded that the donor should realize income. Id. at 439.
86 634 F.2d at 17.
87 See notes 10-28 and accompanying text supra.
88 643 F.2d at 503-04. (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 504 (quoting Note, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 139, 151 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TEMPLE
Note]).
90 81-1 USTC 1 9362, 47 AM. FED. TAx REP. 2d (P-H) 81-1457 (N.D. Iowa 1981). In
Molinaro, stock transfers were conditioned upon the transferees' (various relatives and trusts)
assumption of the taxpayer's gift tax liability in proportion to the shares received. The dis-
trict court held that Diedrich warranted a finding of taxable income to the donors to the
extent that the gift tax liability assumed by the donees exceeded the donors' adjusted basis in
the stock. Id. at 81-1459.
91 Id.
92 Id. The Tax Court in Hirst had indicated that it would continue to follow Turner in
net gift cases until a clear-cut overruling had taken place. 63 T.C. at 314-15. The Molinaro
court considered Diedrich to be the vitiating agent. See also note 65 supra.
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III. Critique of Turner's Intent Theory
Turner and its progeny have been criticized by commentators.
93
These cases allowed donors to characterize net gift transfers as net
gifts for income tax purposes as well as gift tax purposes,94 even
though income tax provisions are to be construed separately from gift
tax provisions,95 and held that initial donative intent justified tax-
free treatment.96 However, a transfer may be a net gift for gift tax
purposes and still expose the donor to income tax liability; therefore
the Turner intent standard has not been applied properly to a net gift
transfer.
The legal precedent used by the Turner court failed to directly
support the decision. The cases cited by the court 97 involved trust
income under Code sections 671 and 677, and were unrelated to do-
nee assumption of gift tax liabilities creating donor income.98
The Turner court was concerned that the Commissioner's posi-
tion would allow a double credit to transferees in calculating their
adjusted basis for the money paid as gift tax.99 Johnson, however, re-
solved this question in the Commissioner's favor.1OO
93 See, e.g., TEMPLE Note, supra note 89; Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered Gifts-
The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 935 (1976); 48 TENN. L. REV. 404 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as TENNESSEE Comment]; RUTGERS Comment, supra note 38; CORNELL Comment,
supra note 42.
94 572 F.2d at 437 (Thomsen, J., dissenting).
95 See Farid-Es-Sultanch v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1947).
96 See notes 29-65 and accompanying text supra.
97 Sheaffer's Estate v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), afd, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 818 (1963); Morgan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 981, afd, 316 F.2d 238 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1962); Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 260 (1962), aj'd, 136
F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943); Estate of Sheaffer, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 646
(1966).
98 See TEMPLE Note, supra note 89, at 153. See also note 38 supra.
99 The court's concern in Turner arose from Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a), which.states that
the transferee's basis in a part gift, part-sale calculation would be the amount paid for the
property plus the amount of gift tax paid on the transfer. The Turner court felt that applica-
tion of this regulation, when the gift tax had been paid by the transferee, would result in a
double credit to the transferee. The rationale behind the court's concern can best be seen in
an example.
Assume that A transfers to B property worth $20,000 upon the condition that B pay the
resulting gift taxes of $2,000. Since this is a part gift, part sale, B's basis under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1015-4(a) is the amount paid by B for the property ($2,000) plus the amount of gift taxes
paid on the transfer ($2,000). B's resulting basis is $4,000. From this the Turner court would
conclude that B received a double credit.
100 Johnson held that both credits to the transferee's adjusted basis were independently
proper. The court found that the amount received by the transferor should be credited to the
transferee's basis because the transferor has to pay a capital gains tax on the amount of appre-
ciation of his stock. Since this portion of the stock has already been taxed it should not be
taxed again. The Johnson court found that the transferee's basis should also be credited for
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The intent approach also ignores the Supreme Court's decision
in Helvering v. Bruun,' 0 which held that although economic gain is
not always taxable as income, such gain may arise from an exchange
of property, payment of a taxpayer's indebtedness, relief from a lia-
bility, or other profit realized from the completion of a transaction. 1
0 2
The receipt of some economic benefit is the crucial factor. 0 3 Old Col-
ony Trust stated that the taxpayer received a benefit upon relief of an
encumbrance for which he is personally liable. 04 Crane extended this
concept to apply in situations where the taxpayer is not personally
liable and no other party has assumed the debt. 0 5
Pertinent policy concerns exist in the net gift area, yet courts
have not discussed such policies at any length. Arguments for non-
taxable net gift treatment rest primarily on the notion of fairness. A
donor with a small amount of liquid assets may be unable to give
away an asset such as a building without selling either part of the
building or other assets to pay the gift taxes. Another concern is the
possible inhibitive effect that an income tax could have on gratuitous
transfers. Donors, if taxed, will have less incentive to make gifts de-
spite the donee's payment of the gift tax.
Policy concerns favoring income tax imposition also have merit.
First, the income tax liability would not arise until the gift tax as-
sessed on the transfer exceeded the donor's adjusted basis; thus for
liability to occur the property would have to be highly appreci-
ated.106 Second, a greater legal certainty would exist under an objec-
tive economic benefit standard. Third, an objective standard would
treat similarly situated taxpayers more equitably than a subjective
intent standard.
0 7
the amount of gift taxes paid because otherwise "a donor would recognize that a shift of
resources to the donees would incur a tax without a corresponding adjustment in basis for the
donees." 495 F.2d at 1085.
101 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
102 Id. at 469.
103 Id.
104 279 U.S. at 729. See note 15 supra.
105 331 U.S. at 13. See note 14 supra.
106 The donor's income tax liability would be assessed on the excess of the gift tax liability
over the property's adjusted basis. Since the gift tax liability is a fraction of the property's
value at the time of transfer, see notes 107 and 117 infra, the value must have greatly appreci-
ated in order for the gift tax to exceed the property's adjusted basis.
107 See note 84 supra. This may be illustrated with an example. Assume A makes a net
gift of 40 acres of land to B, each acre having a fair market value of $10,000 and a basis of
$500. The net gift is $356,731 and the gift tax on the transfer is $43,269. See 1975-1 C.B. 310
(superseding Rev. Rul. 71-232, 197 1-1 C.B. 275); TENNESSEE Comment, supra note 93, at 406.
C, similarly situated to A, transfers 35.67 lots to D and retains 4.33, which he then sells in
order to pay the gift tax. Since C had to sell 4.33 lots, with a total fair market value of
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Stare decisis and "fair play" have been used to perpetuate incor-
rect results. The Hirst court refused to recognize any benefit accru-
ing to Mrs. Hirst in the interest of fairness.10 8 In Heng, the court
relied upon stare decisis and fair play where the assessed tax defi-
ciency exceeded $600,000 and the taxpayer had relied upon Turner as
clear precedent.' 0 9 These two factors motivated the Tax Court to
follow Turner, even though the court seemed uncertain of its sound-
ness as precedent. 01 Finally, the Owen decision was based solely on
Turner's status as precedent. The Sixth Circuit indicated that stare
decisis dictated its decision,"' but that they would have applied
Johnson had it not been for the indistinguishable Turner facts." 2 The
court noted the taxpayer's reliance on Turner, and allowed this reli-
ance only because the taxpayer conducted the transactions before
Johnson was decided." 3 The Owen court concluded that "in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than it be settled right."" 4 This position hardly comports with the
judicial system's traditional goal of doing justice for both parties.
V. Conclusion
Conflicting decisions on the income tax consequences of net gifts
have prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to .Diedrich.' 5
The Court's decision should guide courts in deciding similar cases on
appeal 1 6 and provide certainty in the net gift area. The Court will
do that if it approves the economic benefit test used by the Sixth
Circuit in Deidrich." 7 Since Turner's vitality has been weakened by
$43,300 and a total basis of $2,165, he must realize capital gains of $41,135. The donor's gift
tax on the transfer is $42,918. I.R.C. § 2001. If the motivations of A and C are the same then
A, like C, should be taxed to the extent the gift taxes paid by the donee exceed A's basis in the
property transferred. A should recognize capital gain in the year of the transfer. See also
author's example in CORNELL Comment, supra note 42, at 1084-85 n.88; and notes 38-42 and
accompanying text sufra.
108 See note 55 sup ra.
109 69 T.C. at 675.
110 Id.
111 81-2 USTC at 87,663.
112 Id. &n.16.
113 Id. at 87,664.
114 Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)).
115 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981).
116 Two factually similar cases on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Estate of Henry v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 665 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. July 31, 1978), and Benson v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 989 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1032 (6th Cir. Jan. 22,
1979), have been removed from the court calendar pending the Supreme Court's decision in
Diedrich.
117 As a practical matter, imposition of tax liability upon the donor will result in moder-
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Johnson, the court should also consider overturning Turner, thereby
removing any possible confusion about the law in the net gift setting.
The Supreme Court's affirmance of Diedrich will solidify the eco-
nomic benefit test as the benchmark for taxpayers to rely upon in
making transfers of appreciated property subject to the donee's as-





ate tax rates. For example, assume the donor transfers property in 1982 with a fair market
value of $1,000,000 and no adjusted basis to the donee on the condition that the donee pay
the resulting gift tax on the transfer. Also assume the donor is unmarried and not the head of
a household or a surviving spouse, receives no other income during the year, and has made no
gifts in preceeding years. The gift tax on the transfer would be $202,110. Se 1975-1 C.B. 310
(supersedig Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 C.B. 275); TENNESSEE Comment, supra note 93, at 406.
The donor's highest possible income tax liability on the transfer would therefore be $31,740,
representing 3 percent of the fair market value of the gift, 16 percent of the capital gain, and
39 percent of his taxable income.
Using the same assumptions as above, on a $2,000,000 net gift the gift tax liability (capi-
tal gain to donor) would be $494,242, resulting in a maximum income tax liability of $90,166.
This figure represents 5 percent of the fair market value of the property transferred, 18 per-
cent of the capital gain, and 46 percent of the donor's taxable income. See TENNESSEE Com-
ment, supra note 93, at 406. These figures are calculated without any adjusted basis in the
property transferred, an unlikely event when property has such value. Were an adjusted basis
subtracted from the capital gain, the donor would be liable for substantially less income tax
because the basis is deducted directly from the taxable income of the donor.
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Search and Seizure-FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL SCOPE OF WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
The fourth amendment established the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures . ... I The Supreme Court of the
United States has sought to protect each person's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy 2 by holding that warrantless searches are "per se"
unreasonable. 3 However, there are certain exceptions to this general
warrant requirement.4 The Supreme Court has found the "automo-
bile exception" to the warrant requirement 5 particularly troublesome
when applied to the search of a container found during an automo-
bile search. While the Supreme Court has clearly defined warrant-
less automobile searches,6 it has not adequately defined the
constitutional scope of the warrantless search of containers found
during such searches.
This article examines two recent Supreme Court decisions which
address the constitutional scope of warrantless searches of containers
1 U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
2 Prior to 1967, the fourth amendment was interpreted as only protecting against a
physical intrusion or "trespass" into a "constitutionally protected area." See, e.g., Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427,439 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,512 (1961);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,464 (1928). The Supreme Court rejected this inter-
pretation in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice Stewart stated:
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). Thus the Court shifted from protecting the security of pri-
vate property to protecting a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).
3 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-
99 (1958).
4 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(search incident to arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automo-
bile exception).
5 See gera/ly Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
6 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970).
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found during automobile searches.7 Part I reviews the historical de-
velopment of the "automobile exception" to the warrant require-
ment; Part II analyzes the two most recent Supreme Court decisions
in this area; and Part III proposes a test for determining the constitu-
tionality of warrantless searches of containers found during automo-
bile searches.
I. The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court has recognized a difference under the
fourth amendment between home searches and automobile searches.,
Generally, a police officer must obtain a search warrant before
searching a home; probable cause alone is insufficient. 9 However,
upon lawfully stopping an automobile, a police officer may search
the automobile without obtaining a search warrant if he has proba-
ble cause to believe the automobile contains contraband. 10
The Court relied originally on the automobile's inherent mobil-
ity as the main rationale justifying warrantless automobile searches. I"
However, the lesser expectation of privacy in the automobile as com-
pared to the home has emerged as a more important rationale for the
automobile exception.' 2 The Court has cited several factors explain-
ing this lesser privacy expectation. First, the automobile serves as
transportation, not as a repository for personal effects.' 3 Second, the
automobile travels public roads where its occupants and contents are
in plain view.' 4 Finally, the states have regulated the use of
automobiles through laws requiring registration of automobiles and
7 Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981); New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860
(1981).
8 399 U.S. at 48; 267 U.S. at 153.
9 The Court recently reaffirmed that a search warrant is needed to search a person's
home, Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1647 (1981).
10 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51. The Court has noted that when an automobile
is stopped on the highway, the opportunity to search may be fleeting because the automobile
is readily movable. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153. However, the Supreme
Court has found unconstitutional the warrantless search of an automobile parked in the de-
fendant's driveway. The Court in Coolidge noted that the automobile was not being used for
any illegal purpose, and that the police officers had ample opportunity to obtain a search
warrant. The Court concluded that: "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears."
Id.; 403 U.S. at 479-80.
11 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153.
12 See Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974).
13 Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. at 13.




The Court, prior to July 1981, had not addressed the warrantless
search of containers found during traditional automobile exception
searches. The Court has addressed in Chadwick v. United States 16 and
Arkansas v. Sanders'7 the search of containers located in automobiles.
However, these cases are not "automobile exception" cases. The lo-
cus of the search in both Chadwick and Sanders was the container and
not the automobile. 8 In both cases, police officers had probable
cause to believe that the container held contraband even before the
container was placed in the automobile. The relationship between
the container and the automobile was mere coincidence. 19
Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a locked footlocker
located in the trunk of a parked car.20 In Chadwick, the government
argued that the warrant requirement only applied to home searches,
and that the standard for searches outside the home should be proba-
ble cause.2' The Court rejected this argument. Noting that the
fourth amendment "protects people, not places," 22 the Court found
that people may have constitutionally protected privacy expectations
both inside and outside the home.2 3 The Court then found that the
warrantless search of the locked footlocker violated Chadwick's rea-
sonable privacy expectations under the fourth amendment.24
The Court distinguished Chadwick from the automobile search
cases in two ways. First, a person has a greater privacy expectation
in his luggage than he has in his automobile.2 5 Second, taking pos-
session of luggage while obtaining a search warrant places fewer bur-
dens on police officers than taking possession of an automobile for
that time period.
26
Arkansas v. Sanders27 dealt with the warrantless search of luggage
15 Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
16 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
17 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
18 Chief Justice Burger points out this distinction in his concurring opinion in Sanders.
442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
19 Id.
20 433 U.S. at 15.
21 Id. at 6-7.
22 Id. at 7 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, at 351).
23 Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. at 7.
24 Id. at 11.
25 Id. at 12.
26 Id. at 13 n.7. The Court stated that an automobile is distinguishable from luggage
based on its size, and on the need for adequate storage facilities to protect it from theft or
vandalism. Id.
27 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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taken from a legally stopped automobile. In Sanders, the Court reiter-
ated the Chadwick reasoning that the exigencies associated with an
automobile search are not present in a luggage search. 28 The Court
held that placing closed luggage in an automobile does not extin-
guish a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the luggage.2 9
Many federal and state courts have interpreted Chadwick and Sanders
as holding that constitutional distinctions may be based on the type
of container searched. 30 Relying on Chadwick and Sanders, these
courts have suggested that containers generally used to store non-
personal items may constitutionally be given less protection under
the fourth amendment than containers commonly used to store per-
sonal items.3' This analysis stems from the language in Chadwick and
Sanders indicating that reasonable expectations of privacy are vio-
lated by a warrantless luggage search because people generally store
personal items in luggage.
32
The foregoing summarizes the pre-July 1981 law regarding war-
rantless searches of automobiles and containers located in
automobiles but not found in an automobile exception search. In
July 1981, the Supreme Court clarified the law regarding constitu-
tional distinctions based on the type of container, and announced
tests for analyzing the constitutional scope of warrantless searches.
II. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
On July 1, 1981, the Supreme Court announced its decisions in
Robbins v. Cal4fr m'a33 and New York . Belton.34 Both cases addressed
the constitutional scope of warrantless searches of containers found
during an automobile search. In Robbins, the container was discov-
ered in the trunk of the automobile. In Belton, the container was
found in the interior passenger area of the automobile.
A. Robbins v. California
In Robbzis, police officers legally stopped an automobile and
searched it for drugs which they had probable cause to believe were
28 Id. at 763-64.
29 Id. at 764-65.
30 See cases collected in United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1174-75 nn.3 & 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Tamm, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13,
1981).
31 Id.
32 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764; Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. at 13.
33 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
34 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
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present.35 While legally searching the trunk, the police officers found
two brick-shaped objects wrapped in opaque plastic and sealed with
tape. The police officers opened the plastic wrapping without ob-
taining a search warrant, and discovered that the packages contained
marijuana.36 In a plurality opinion,37 the Court held that the war-
rantless container search violated the fourth amendment.
38
The Court in Robbins rejected the suggestion that the type of
container searched might determine a person's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in it.39 The Court stated that the fourth amendment
makes no distinction between personal and non-personal property.
40
If the owner shows that he does not want the contents of his
container made public-generally by closing the container-the
fourth amendment must protect his reasonable privacy expecta-
tions.4 1 The Court rejected any constitutional distinction between
containers based on a personal contents/non-personal contents di-
chotomy because of the problems inherent in objectively distinguish-
ing the possible contents of particular container types.42 "What one
person may put in a suitcase, another may put in a plastic bag," the
Court reasoned.
43
In Robbins, the Court attempted to establish a "bright line" con-
stitutionality test for searches of containers found during legal
searches of stopped automobiles. With two exceptions, 44 closed con-
tainers found in the non-passenger areas45 of legally stopped
35 101 S. Ct. at 2844.
36 Id.
37 Justice Stewart wrote an opinion in which Justices Brennen, Marshall and White
joined. Justice Powell concurred in the result, but not in the opinion. Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the judgment without writing a separate opinion. Justices Blackmun, Rehn-
quist, and Stevens dissented.
38 101 S. Ct. at 2847.
39 Id. at 2845-46.




44 The two exceptions are (1) containers which reveal their contents by their outward
appearance (such as a gun case); and (2) containers whose contents are in plain view (such as
an open container or a clear plastic bag). These exceptions were originally discussed in Sand-
ers: "Thus, some containers. . . by their very nature cannot support a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.
Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviat-
ing the need for a warrant." Sanders v. Arkansas, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13.
45 Police officers may conduct warrantless searches of containers found in the passenger
area of an automobile if one of the automobile's occupants has been arrested. See New York
v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). See also text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
[Vol. 57:435]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
automobiles cannot be searched without a warrant.
The Robbins approach should be advantageous to the courts and
to police officers in that it should diminish the difficulty of distin-
guishing between different types of containers. 46 However, this ap-
proach may be burdensome in terms of time and manpower
pressures on police agencies. As Justice Powell noted, a police officer
will have to fill out appropriate forms, await a decision from a magis-
trate, and finally obtain a warrant before being able to search even
the most inconsequential container. 47 These procedures may remove
the police officer from his normal duties for extended periods of
time.
48
The extent to which Robbins will affect fourth amendment law is
not clear.49 The Court's opinion was supported by only a plurality of
its members. Justice Powell's concurrence, on which the final deci-
sion depended, rejected the plurality's rationale.50
B. New York v. Belton
The Supreme Court decided New York v. Belton51 on the same
day as Robbb's. In Belton, a police officer arrested the occupants of a
car he had legally stopped. While searching the automobile's inte-
rior, he found a jacket. The police officer searched a zippered pocket
of the jacket and found cocaine.52 The Court held that the search
was a constitutional search incident to a valid custodial arrest.
53
46 As Justice Blackmun noted, however, the "bright line" test does not resolve whether a
container's exterior "announce[s] its contents." 101 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"[O]nly time will tell whether the 'test' for determining whether a package's exterior an-
nounce[s] its contents will lead to a new stream of litigation." Id.
47 Id. at 2849 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell cited a Dixie Cup and a cigar box
as two examples of such inconsequential containers. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
48 The burden on police is even greater in rural areas, where a police officer may have to
travel long distances just to find a magistrate. Id. at 2852 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell points out that this administrative burden would be justified if significant fourth
amendment values were being protected. However, he found no such protection. Id. at 2849-
50 (Powell, J., concurring).
49 The Third Circuit has already indicated that it will not accept Robbirn as binding
precedent. Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981). Rasool involved a warrant-
less search, with probable cause, of a paper bag on the back seat of a car. Although the case
was ultimately decided on the authority of New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), the
court rejected Robbiks in dicta. For a general discussion of the precedential value of plurality
decisions, see Comment, The recedential Value of Supreme Court Pluralily Deciaolmt, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 756 (1980).
50 101 S. Ct. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
51 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
52 Id. at 2862.
53 Id. at 2865.
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In Chime! v. California,54 the Court stated the principles gov-
erning the geographic area which can be constitutionally subjected
to a warrantless search incident to an arrest.55 In applying the Chime!
principles to an automobile search, the Court in Belton permitted,
incident to arrest, the warrantless search of the interior passenger
area of an automobile and any containers found in that area.
56
In Belton, the police officer had arrested the defendants and
taken them away from the automobile before he searched the auto-
mobile's interior and the zippered jacket pocket in which he found
the illegal drugs.57 The defendants could not have gained access to
the automobile's interior at the time of arrest.58 Therefore, the hold-
ing in Belton appears to permit police officers to search an automo-
bile's interior incident to an arrest regardless of whether any danger
exists that a suspect may gain access to that area.
Chime/'s holding was based on two premises: (1) the police of-
ficer's well-being requires that he must prevent the arrestee from
gaining access to a dangerous weapon; and (2) the state's interest in
preserving evidence requires that police officers must prevent the ar-
restee from destroying evidence. 59 In Belton, the Court expanded the
constitutional scope of a search incident to an arrest by allowing po-
lice officers to conduct a warrantless search incident to an arrest even
though any weapons or evidence in the automobile's interior were
outside the arrestee's possible access.
The legal fiction used in Belton, that an automobile's passenger
area is always within the arrestee's reach,6° appears to run counter to
the Court's earlier statement that any warrantless search must be
54 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
55 In Chimd, the Court held that a police officer may legally search the area in the arres-
tee's immediate control. This area includes the geographical area from which the arrestee
may gain control of a weapon or evidence. Id. at 763.
56 101 S. Ct. at 2864.
57 Id. at 2862.
58 Justice Brennan emphasizes this point in his dissent. 101 S. Ct. at 2867 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). This was also the conclusion the New York Court of Appeals reached. People v.
Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 452 n.2, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423 n.2, 429 N.Y.S.2d, 574, 577 n.2 (1980),
revi'd, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
59 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
60 101 S. Ct. at 2867 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's application of Chimel to the
facts in Bdton does create a legal fiction. It would be physically uncomfortable, if not impossi-
ble, for a police officer to conduct a thorough search while the automobile's occupants remain
in the automobile. Conducting a search in this manner would also be dangerous for the
police officer. Therefore, the police officer must remove the occupants from the automobile
before he can conduct a search. Once removed from the automobile, the occupants no longer
have access to the automobile's interior. As a result, a search incident to arrest in the Belon
situation cannot be justified under the Chimet rationale.
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"strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its
initiation possible."'61 The circumstances which make a search inci-
dent to arrest possible are the necessities of protecting police officers
and preserving evidence in an insecure situation. However, police
officers are not threatened by weapons inside an automobile's inte-
rior, and the preservation of evidence in the automobile's interior is
not threatened, if the arrestee has no access to that area.
62
The Belton holding would apparently allow police officers to use
routine traffic arrests63 as a basis for searching an automobile's inte-
rior and any container found there. As a result, the Belton holding
has increased the possibility that police officers might use routine
traffic violations as a pretext to stop an automobile, arrest the driver,
and search the automobile. That holding has also disposed of both
the search warrant and probable cause restrictions on police officers
who search an automobile's interior pursuant to a traffic violation
arrest.64 As Justice White stated: "This [authorization of a search
without any type of reasonable suspicion] calls for more caution than
the court exhibits ....
The Court's holdings in Robbins and Belton demonstrate the
problems inherent in analyzing the constitutionality of container
searches conducted during warrantless automobile searches. In one
day, the Court both narrowed and broadened the scope of the war-
rant requirement in these situations. Reading Robbins and Be/ton to-
gether, the Supreme Court ruled that, notwithstanding a lack of
probable cause to search, police officers may conduct a warrantless
search of the interior passenger area of any automobile and any
container found there, provided they have legally arrested one of the
61 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
62 All of the concurring and dissenting justices in Belton except Justice Rehnquist view
Belton as an extreme and unjustified extension of Chimel. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct.
2841, 2858-59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in Robbies and concurring in Be/ton); New York v.
Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2868 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 2870 (White, J.,
dissenting).
63 Certain states authorize police to make full custodial arrests for routine traffic viola-
tions. See 101 S. Ct. at 2858-59 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting in Robbins and concurring in
BeIon). Such arrests are not constitutionally prohibited, although a strong argument can be
made that they should be. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2.
64 See 101 S. Ct. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting in Robbins and concurring in Be/ton). A
police officer is not required to demonstrate probable cause for making a search incident to
arrest. 101 S. Ct. at 2864; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). Probable
cause must support the arrest, however. In Robinson, the police officer had probable cause to
arrest. id. at 227.
65 101 S. Ct. at 2870 (White, J., dissenting).
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automobile's occupants.6 6 However, police officers may not search
containers found in any other part of the automobile without a
search warrant, even if they have probable cause to search, unless the
container's illegal contents are obvious to the observer.
6 7
In both Robbins and Belton, the police legally stopped an automo-
bile, smelled marijuana smoke, and found other facts indicating
drugs were present in the automobile.68 These facts were sufficient to
form probable cause to search the automobile in Robbins and proba-
ble cause to arrest the suspects in Belton.69 In Robbins, probable cause
justified the search which led to the container, the plastic-covered
marijuana. In Belton, the legal arrest justified the search which led to
the container, the jacket pocket. The only significant factual differ-
ence between Robbins and Belton was the location of the container
searched; the plastic-covered marijuana in Robbins was found in the
automobile's trunk,70 while the jacket in Belton was found in the au-
tomobile's backseat. 71 This single factual difference does not support
the Court's use of two different tests resulting in inconsistent holdings
in these factually similar cases. A single test yielding consistent re-
sults in factually similar automobile search cases is needed.
III. Proposed Test
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case of United
States v. Ross, 72 a case factually similar to Robbins. In Ross, police of-
ficers searched a paper sack found in the trunk of a legally stopped
automobile.73 The police officers had probable cause to search the
automobile for illegal drugs. 74 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit found the search to be
unconstitutional.
75
Although the District of Columbia Circuit decided Ross before
66 See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
67 See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
68 Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2843-44 (1981); New York v Belton, 101 S. Ct.
2860, 2861-62 (1981).
69 101 S. Ct. at 2844. From these facts, the Court assumed probable cause in Robbins.
The Court made no such probable cause assumption in Belton. Because of the almost identi-
cal facts, it is reasonable to assume probable cause in Beiton.
70 Id.
71 101 S. Ct. at 2862.
72 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13,
1981).
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the Supreme Court decided Robbins, its holding in Ross followed a
rationale very similar to that which the Supreme Court later adopted
in Robbins.76 The District of Columbia Circuit held that a person's
expectation of privacy does not depend on the type of container
searched and that a person could have a constitutionally protected
privacy expectation in a paper sack.
77
Ross, Robbins and Belton all present a similar scenario: (1) a po-
lice officer legally stops an automobile; (2) the police officer finds
facts sufficient to justify a search, which leads to the discovery of a
container; and (3) the police officer searches the container found in
the automobile. Any proposed test should resolve these three cases in
a consistent manner.
A test requiring strict application of the warrant requirement-
the test used in Robbins and Ross-would render consistent results in
cases like Ross, Robbins and Belton. However, this approach does have
several administrative and theoretical shortcomings. First, as dis-
cussed previously, this approach may place burdensome time and
manpower pressures on police departments. 78 Second, based on a
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, it seems intuitively incon-
sistent to permit police officers to conduct warrantless searches of
locked glove compartments 79 or automobile trunks,80 while ruling
unconstitutional police officers' warrantless searches of closed con-
tainers found during automobile searches. A person's expectation of
privacy in his locked glove compartment or trunk is certainly no less
than his privacy expectation in a paper sack or even in a locked box
located in the same automobile. 81 Finally, a strict warrant require-
ment would necessitate detaining the automobile's occupants until a
warrant can be obtained. The occupants must then choose between
consenting to an immediate search, or being detained until a deter-
mination can be made as to whether a warrant will be issued.8 2 This
choice poses the danger that police officers may be tempted to
76 In rejecting what the District of Columbia had termed the "worthy container rule,"
the Supreme Court's opinion in Robbins, authored by Justice Stewart, had cited with approval
the majority opinion in Ross. 101 S. Ct. at 2846. (The D.C. Circuit in Ross used both "wor-
thy container rule" and "unworthy container rule" to describe the same rule. We will use the
term "worthy container rule.").
77 655 F.2d at 1171.
78 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
79 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1979).
80 See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
81 Judge Wilkey made this point in his dissent in Ross, 655 F.2d at 1194 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
82 Id. at 1198-99.
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threaten detention in order to coerce consent.8 3
Justice Stevens, in Robbins and Belton, suggested applying the au-
tomobile exception to searches of containers found during a lawful
warrantless automobile search.84 Applying the automobile exception
to container searches would allow the police officer to search both the
automobile and any containers found in the automobile without a
warrant, provided the police officer had probable cause to believe
contraband would be found.
8 5
In his dissenting opinion in Ross, Judge Wilkey noted the pur-
poses for requiring a search warrant for home searches. First, in cases
where a magistrate does not find probable cause, and therefore does
not issue a search warrant, the warrant requirement eliminates any
official intrusion. Second, the search warrant restricts the search's
scope. Finally, a search warrant reassures the subject of the search
that the police officers demanding to enter his home are official po-
lice agents lawfully authorized to conduct the search.8 6
In cases where police officers seize a container from an automo-
bile after a legal warrantless search, the three purposes for requiring
a warrant "largely evaporate."8' 7 First, if the magistrate does not is-
sue a warrant to search the containers seized, the level of intrusion is
reduced only slightly. The police officers have already stopped and
detained the automobile's occupants, and have deprived the occu-
pants of possession and control over the container. Second, the
search warrant does not effectiyely limit the search's scope-the po-
lice officers likely have already',searched the entire automobile. Fi-
nally, after the automobile's occupants have been stopped, searched,
deprived of control over the container, and possibly arrested, "the
moment for reassuring the car's occupants of the lawful purpose of
the police long since will have passed."88
Applying the automobile exception to the searches of containers
found during an automobile search would eliminate the necessity of
a search warrant in those cases; however, the courts would require
83 Judge Wilkey noted that the threat of arrest and its trappings-booking, fingerprint-
ing, and so forth-will have a powerfully coercive effect on innocent persons because of the
popular perception of the lifelong consequences of an arrest record. Id. at 1199.
84 101 S. Ct. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting in Robbins and conurring in Be/ton).
85 Probable cause requires that the container being searched must be reasonably capable
of holding the contraband being sought. Id. at 2857 n.8. For example, police officers could
not claim to have probable cause in searching a matchbox for an illegal shotgun, but they
could make such a claim in searching almost any container for illegal drugs.
86 655 F.2d at 1194-95 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 1195. Accord, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88 655 F.2d at 1195 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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police officers to demonstrate probable cause before admitting any
evidence discovered in such a search. Although the Supreme Court
has shown strong preference for the warrant requirement as a safe-
guard against unreasonable searches,8 9 it has allowed warrantless au-
tomobile searches based on probable cause. 90 The rationales which
support warrantless automobile searches also support warrantless
searches of containers found during a valid warrantless automobile
search. These rationales include: (1) avoiding the time and man-
power burdens involved in detaining property and suspects while
waiting for a magistrate to issue a warrant;91 (2) the mobility of the
automobile and the suspects, often making obtaining a search war-
rant impracticable; and (3) the lesser expectation of privacy in an
automobile, which has been extended to integral parts of the auto-
mobile. Also, the warrant requirement entails detaining the
container and the suspects until a warrant is issued. This detention is
in itself a substantial instrusion upon a suspect. To say that this in-
trusion is justified as a lesser intrusion than a warrantless search is, as
the Court has said in a similar context, "a debatable question
"92
Adopting either the strict warrant requirement or the automo-
bile exception in analyzing searches of containers found during auto-
mobile searches would help eliminate the danger of police using
routine traffic arrests as a pretext to search without a search warrant
or probable cause. The strict warrant standard requires a search
warrant before a search; the automobile exception requires probable
cause for a search. Also, adopting either the strict warrant require-
ment or the automobile exception would eliminate any "worthy
89 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51. Justice White, writing for the Court,
stated:
In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum require-
ment for a reasonable search under the Constitution. As a general rule, it has also
required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable cause issue and the issuance
of a warrant before a search is made.
Id.
90 See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
91 See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1196-97 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (regarding detention of sus-
pects while awaiting the warrant).
92 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1969). "But which is the 'greater' and which
is the 'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question. ... For constitutional purposes, we see
no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the proba-
ble cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search
without a warrant." Id. at 51-52.
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container rule" which would require courts and police officers to
make the often impossible distinctions as to which containers require
fourth amendment protection and which do not.
However, applying the automobile exception to searches of con-
tainers found during automobile searches has advantages over the
present law. First, law enforcement will not be burdened by the time
and manpower pressures which the Robbins blanket warrant require-
ment imposes.93 Also, the Court would no longer have to strain, as it
did in Belton, to justify seemingly reasonable searches which would
not be allowed under the strict warrant requirement. As Belton aptly
demonstrates, such straining can have dangerous consequences.
94
IV. Conclusion
The automobile exception to the search warrant requirement
should be the constitutional test of warrantless searches of containers
found during a legal automobile search. Analysis of the container
search cases under the automobile exception will result in consistent
holdings and provide protection against unreasonable searches.
Under this test, a police officer may constitutionally search without a
search warrant any containers found in a legally stopped automobile
provided he has probable cause to search the automobile and the
container for contraband.
Justice Powell views a test based on the automobile exception as
a "ground for agreement" by a majority of the Supreme Court.95 He
has stated: "[The Court has] an institutional responsibility . . . to
make every reasonable effort to harmonize our views on constitu-
tional questions of broad practical application. '96 Applying the au-
tomobile exception to warrantless searches of containers found
during legal automobile searches would bring harmony to an area of




93 See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
94 As pointed out, Belton, in bypassing both the warrant and probable cause require-
ments, seems to have opened the door to using routing traffic stops as a pretext to search an
automobile's interior. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra. Applying the automobile
exception in Be/ton would have justified the search without straining the search incident to
arrest rationales.
95 Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2850 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 2851 n.4.
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